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Abstract
We study an investment model in which agents have the wrong beliefs about the dy-
namic properties of fundamentals. Specically, we assume that agents under-estimate
the rate of mean reversion. The model exhibits the following six properties. (1) Beliefs
are excessively optimistic in good times and excessively pessimistic in bad times. (2)
Asset prices are too volatile. (3) Excess returns are negatively autocorrelated. (4) High
levels of corporate prots predict negative future excess returns. (5) Real economic
activity is excessively volatile; the economy experiences amplied investment cycles.
(6) Corporate prots are positively autocorrelated in the short-run and negatively au-
tocorrelated in the medium run. The paper provides an illustrative model of animal
spirits, amplied business cycles and excess volatility.
Prepared for the Conference in Honor of Benjamin Friedman, held at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
on April 22-23, 2011. We are grateful to our discussant Paul Willen for comments and to Brendan Price
and Michael Puempel for excellent research assistance. David Laibson acknowledges support from the NIA
(P01AG005842). The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and are not necessarily reective
of views at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System.
11 Introduction
We study an economy in which agents have the wrong beliefs about the dynamic properties
of fundamentals (cf. Friedman, 1979). The premise of our approach is that economic agents
tend to make forecasts based on statistical models or mental representations that tend to
underestimate the degree of long-run mean reversion in fundamentals (cf. Fuster, Laibson,
and Mendel, 2010; Fuster, Hebert, and Laibson, 2011).
In particular, we analyze a standard investment q-model in which agents underestimate
the degree of mean reversion.1 An economy that features such a bias will exhibit the follow-
ing six properties: (1) procyclical excess optimism, (2) excessively volatile asset prices, (3)
negatively autocorrelated excess returns, (4) a negative relationship between current corpo-
rate prots and future excess returns, (5) amplied investment cycles, and (6) negatively
autocorrelated corporate prots in the medium run. In summary, this paper presents an il-
lustrative model of animal spirits, amplied business cycles and excess volatility. The model
provides a formal description of investment boom-bust cycles associated with \this time is
dierent" (Reinhart and Rogo, 2009) or \new era" (Shiller, 2005) forecasting errors.
Studying macroeconomic models in which agents underestimate the degree of mean re-
version is relevant for three inter-related reasons.
First, there are several psychological biases that lead agents to underestimate mean rever-
sion; e.g., representativeness, anchoring, and availability bias (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973;
Tversky and Kahneman, 1973, 1974). Representativeness refers to the bias of mistakenly
believing that properties experienced by small samples are equally present in larger samples.
Thus, a small sample of recent observations are viewed as representative of the future. An-
choring and availability bias refer to the overweighting of easily accesible information, such
as the most recent observation, which leads agents to overestimate the persistence of current
conditions.
1This complements the analysis presented in Fuster et al. (2011), where we study the consequences of
biased expectations for asset prices and consumption dynamics in an economy with an exogenous stock of
domestic capital. In the current paper we allow the domestic capital stock to be endogenous.
2Second, statistical arguments favor parsimonious models, and in practice, agents do tend
to estimate and employ simple forecasting models that incorporate a small number of vari-
ables. In earlier work, we have discussed how simple univariate forecasting models underesti-
mate the amount of mean reversion when true fundamentals follow hump-shaped dynamics.
For example, in Fuster et al. (2011), we study total capital income in the U.S. NIPA accounts.
We nd that the estimated level of long-run persistence of shocks is very sensitive to the
order of the model being estimated: models with a small number of (high-frequency) lags
generate estimates of persistence around one, while models with a large number of lags gener-
ate much lower estimates of persistence. For example, Figure 1 plots the associated impulse
response functions for ARIMA(p,1,0) models with p = 1;10;20;30;40. For ARIMA(p,1,0)
models with p = 1 and 10; the estimated magnitude of persistence is greater than or equal to
one. For ARIMA(p,1,0) models with p = 30 and 40; the estimated level of persistence is less
than or equal to 0.6. More generally, Fuster, Laibson, and Mendel (2010) show that several
macroeconomic time series have persistence estimates that fall sharply with the order of the
model being estimated. We refer to forecasts that are based on simple forecasting models {
e.g., low order ARIMA models { as \natural expectations."
Third, a large body of evidence is consistent with agents overweighting recent observations
and underestimating mean reversion. Some of the best-known evidence comes from the asset
allocation decisions and expectations of investors (e.g. Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Benartzi,
2001; Vissing-Jorgensen, 2003) and analysts (e.g. De Bondt and Thaler, 1990; Bulkley and
Harris, 1997). It is also well-established that many features of the cross-section of stock
returns can be explained with investors overweighting recent observations (e.g. De Bondt
and Thaler, 1985, 1989; Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1994). Additional support comes
from lab experiments where subjects are asked to predict nancial or other time series, or
to trade assets (e.g. De Bondt, 1993; Hey, 1994; Haruvy, Lahav, and Noussair, 2007).
A modeling approach related to ours assumes that agents are rational but do not initially
know the relevant parameters and have to learn them over time (e.g. Friedman, 1979; Sargent,
31993; Evans and Honkapohja, 2001, 2011). Such learning, in particular if the model agents are
updating is misspecied or if they discard old data, can also generate volatility and additional
persistence of shocks to asset prices and the economy (e.g. Friedman and Laibson, 1989;
Branch and Evans, 2007, 2010). A paper that is closely related to ours is Lansing (2009),
which studies an endogenous growth model in which agents overestimate the persistence of
exogenous technology shocks and explores the welfare consequences of this misperception.
The argument of the paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 presents the
model and its solution. Section 3 discusses the key properties of the model and illustrates
these properties by studying the impulse response functions for an illustrative calibration.
Section 4 concludes and identies directions for future research.
2 Investment Model
We study a tractable version of the continuous-time q-model (e.g. Hayashi, 1982). This is a
partial equilibrium model in which agents/rms are assumed to be risk neutral and the risk
free rate is xed.
We rst present the model assuming that agents have correct beliefs about the data gen-
erating process (DGP) for fundamentals. We then analyze the model's properties assuming
that agents believe that they have the correct beliefs about the DGP but actually don't. We
study the model in a deterministic setting, but this assumption is without loss of generality.
Adding Brownian motion to the DGP won't change the impulse response functions that we
report below.
42.1 Notation and denition of the problem for a rational agent
Let i index a xed set of rms on the unit interval, i 2 [0;1]. Let k(i;t) represent the level
of rm i's capital stock at time t. It therefore follows that aggregate capital is given by
K(t) =
Z 1
0
k(i;t)di:
Henceforth, we assume that all rms are identical and suppress the i index. Therefore, we
can write
K(t) = k(t):
Let (K;X) represent the instantaneous ow of revenue per unit of capital, where X is an
exogenous productivity measure. We make the standard assumption that greater (industry-
wide) competition reduces the ow of revenue per unit of capital (holding all else equal). In
other words,
@(K;X)
@K
< 0:
By denition, k(t)(K;X) is the instantaneous revenue ow realized by a rm with k(t)
units of capital. This multiplicative structure implies that individual rms have a constant
returns to scale technology.
To make the model tractable, we assume
(K;X) = 1   K(t) + X(t):
We assume that the exogenous productivity parameter X mean reverts to its long-run
value of zero at rate : Specically,
dX(t) =  X(t)
5where  is a constant.2
Firms only have one decision to make: the ow of investment. Let _ k = I; so I is rm-level
investment. Since rms are identical and indexed on [0,1] it also follows that
_ K =
Z 1
0
I(i;t)di = I(t):
We assume that rms pay quadratic adjustment costs
C(I) =

2
I
2:
We assume that rms also pay a (normalized) price of one for each unit of uninstalled capital.
So the total instantaneous ow cost of a ow of I units of capital is I + C(I):
Finally,  is the discount rate, which is also the (xed) real interest rate, r. Hence, the
objective function of a rm at date t can be written:
Z 1
s=t
exp( (s   t)) [k(s)(K(s);X(s))   I(s)   C(I(s))] ds
subject to the dynamic accumulation equation
dk(t)
dt
= I(t):
The optimizing rms take K(t) as exogenous. In other words, their own choice of I(t) does
not aect the path of K(t).
2Adding Brownian motion to these dynamics, e.g.,
dX =  X + dz
does not aect the impulse response functions that we discuss below. Hence, we omit Brownian motion to
simplify the analysis.
6In equilibrium it must also be true that
dK(t)
dt
= I(t):
2.2 Value Function, FOC, and q
The state variables for this optimization problem are k, K, and X. We include both k and
K since these variables can deviate in principle, though they won't deviate in equilibrium.
The continuous-time Bellman Equation is
V (k;K;X) = sup
I

(k(K;X)   I   C(I)) + E

dV
dt

:
Expanding dV
dt ,
E

dV
dt

=
@V
@k
I +
@V
@K
I  
@V
@X
X:
The rst order condition is the standard one:
1 + C
0(I) =
@V
@k
:
This equation implies that the marginal cost of acquiring and installing capital equals the
marginal value of installed capital.
Alternatively, we can dene the value function as the expected present value of the ow
payos.
V (k(t);K(t);X(t)) = sup
I(s)
Et
Z 1
s=t
exp( (s   t))[k(s)(K(s);X(s))   I(s)   C(I(s))] ds
For now, assume the rm has correct expectations about the future. Following the
standard treatment of this model, dene q(t) as the marginal present value of a unit of
7installed capital:
q(t) = Et
Z 1
t
exp( (s   t))(K(s);X(s))ds
It follows that,
@V (k(t);K(t);X(t))
@k(t)
= q(t)
To show this, note that
k(s) = k(t) +
Z s
t
I(u)du
Substituting into the value function integral,
V (k;K;X) = sup
i(s)
E
Z 1
t
exp( (s   t))

k(t) +
Z s
t
I(u)du

(K(s);X(s))   I(s)   C(I(s))

ds

Dierentiating by k(t), and applying the envelope theorem,
@V (k(s);K(s);X(s))
@k(s)
= E
Z 1
s=t
exp( (s   t))(K(s);X(s))ds

= q(s)
We can think of q as a value function, with a ow payo of (K(t);X(t)). Apply Leibniz's
rule to show that
q = (K(t);X(t)) + Et

dq
dt

:
This equation has a standard asset-return interpretation. The required return on the marginal
unit of capital, q; can be decomposed into a ow return, (K(t);X(t)); and an anticipated
instantaneous capital gain, Et
dq
dt

:
2.3 Solving the System
From our assumption about C(i),
C
0(I) = I
C
0 1(y) =
y

:
8The rm's policy is
I = C
0 1(q   1) =
1

(q   1)
Aggregate capital evolves as
dK
dt
= I =
1

(q   1)
We can now dene a system of rst-order dierential equations. Dene the state vector, z;
for the dierential equation system:
z 
2
6 6
6 6
4
q
K
X
3
7 7
7 7
5
It is convenient to express the evolution of the system in terms of a vector D and a matrix
B:
dz(t)
dt
= D + Bz(t) =
2
6 6 6 6
4
 1
  1

0
3
7 7 7 7
5
+
2
6 6 6 6
4
 1  1
1
 0 0
0 0  
3
7 7 7 7
5
z(t);
Dene the vector z1:
z1 
2
6 6 6 6
4
1
1   
0
3
7 7 7 7
5
:
This will turn out to be the steady state value of z: Note that,
Bz1 =  D:
Assuming B is invertible (which is a convergence assumption), the expectation of z(t) can
be expressed in terms of z1; and deviation term, exp(B)H(t); that vanishes as  goes to
innity:
Et[z(t + )] = z1 + exp(B)H(t):
9All that remains is to solve for the date-t forecasting \constant"H(t).
We know the initial conditions for K and X. Combining these with a transversality
condition { nite q as  goes to innity { allows us to eliminate one of the eigenvalues of B.
The characteristic equation for B is
 ( + )(
2      frac1):
The positive eigenvalue from the right term is greater than , implying innite expected
present value. Let V be the eigenvectors of B. Dene a 2  3 matrix, L, as
L =
2
6
4
0 1 0
0 0 1
3
7
5
We dene V to have the eigenvectors in the usual order, so that the rst vector in V is the
one associated with the largest eigenvalue (the one that should have zero weight). Dene
H(t) as
H(t) = V L
0A(t)
for some length-2 vector A(t). The initial conditions for z(t) satisfy
Lz(t) = Lz1 + LV L
0A(t)
Solving,
A(t) = (LV L
0)
 1L(z(t)   z1)
The H(t) vector can therefore be written as the product of a matrix, M; and z(t)   z1,
H(t) = M(z(t)   z1) = V L
0(LV L
0)
 1L(z(t)   z1):
10Hence the evolution of the system can be written,
z(t + ) = z1 + exp(B)M(z(t)   z1): (1)
It is also useful to note that
MB
kM = B
kM 8k;
which we use in the next subsection. This is true because M is constructed from the eigen-
vectors of B. We can also use M to determine how the vector H(t), and therefore q(t),
evolve. Substituting for  = 0 into (1),
z(t) = z1 + M(z(t)   z1)
Taking the total derivative,
dz(t) = M (D + Bz(t))
We can therefore also represent z(t + ) as
z(t + ) = z1 + exp(MB)M(z(t)   z1):
Note that this formulation is consistent with (1).
2.4 When Agents Have the Wrong Beliefs
Until this point, we have characterized a model in which agents have correct beliefs about the
data generating process (DGP) for X. We now study the case in which the representative
agent has incorrect beliefs. Let ^ B be the perceived DGP process, where the true rate of
mean reversion in productivity, ; is replaced by the perceived rate of mean reversion, b : ^ B
11has associated eigenvectors ^ V and related matrix ^ M. The initial condition is
z(t) = z1 + ^ M(z(t)   z1):
As in the previous section, we can dierentiate and plug in the evolution of z(t). Note that
dz(t) = ^ M (D + Bz(t));
where B is the true dynamics (not the perceived dynamics ^ B). Again solving for z(t + ),
z(t + ) = z1 + exp( ^ MB) ^ M(z(t)   z1) (2)
Note that this equation simplies to the no-mistakes solution if ^ M = M. Equation (2)
characterizes the evolution of the system under the mistaken policy.
2.5 Impulse Response Function
To derive the impulse response function, we study the economy's dynamics when it is per-
turbed out of an initial steady state at date t. Assume for  < 0, that
z(t + ) = z1 =
2
6 6 6
6
4
1
1   
0
3
7 7 7
7
5
:
Note that when z(s) = z1,
dz(s) = D + Bz1 = 0:
Assume that
Lz(t) =
2
6
4
1   
X(t)
3
7
5;
12where X(t) is the size of the initial (date t) impulse to X, the mean-reverting productivity
variable. Note that Lz(t) has only two elements{ it does not include q. Then for all time
  0,
z(t + ) = z1 + exp

^ MB

^ M (L
0Lz(t)   z1):
3 Properties of the Model
3.1 Illustrative Calibration
We now present an illustrative calibration. The model has four free parameters:  (discount
rate),  (convex costs of capital adjustment),  (rate of true mean reversion), and ^  (rate
of perceived mean reversion). The qualitative properties of the model are not aected by
the specic calibration decisions. Hence, the calibration characterizes the general qualitative
properties of the model. We also use the calibration to illustrate the quantitative properties
of the model at the calibrated parameter values.
We set the annual risk-free rate to 5% per year:  = 0:05: Because of the way that we've
scaled adjustment costs,  does not play an important role in driving the model's properties.
Hence, we could choose any (plausible) value for  and our dynamics would eectively be
unchanged.
The parameter that scales capital adjustment costs is set to  = 10=(1   ). With
this calibration, a permanent 10% change in the steady state capital stock has a half-life of
adjustment of slightly more than two years.
We assume that the true dierential equation for X is given by _ X =  0:25X, so  = 0:25:
However, agents perceive relatively little mean reversion: _ X =  0:05X; so ^  = 0:05:
In Fuster et al. (2011), the DGP of fundamentals was hump-shaped and agents were
assumed to get short-run dynamics (approximately) right but to overestimate long-run per-
sistence. In the current paper, short-run dynamics and long-run dynamics are governed by
the same paramter, ; since we are now studying an environment in which agents believe
13(correctly) that productivity dynamics follow a rst-order auto-regressive process. In the cur-
rent model it is therefore impossible for agents to get short-run dynamics right and long-run
dynamics wrong. We study this particular productivity process merely because of its sim-
plicity. In fact, we don't believe that agents would misforecast such a simple auto-regressive
process. The mistake that agents are assumed to make in this model { underestimating
mean reversion { is meant to be a proxy for underestimating long-run mean reversion in a
more realistic model with more complicated dynamics in fundamentals (i.e., short-run mo-
mentum and long-run mean reversion). In a setting where short-run and long-run dynamics
are dierent, it is plausible that agents would misforecast the long-run mean reversion, and
that is what we are capturing in this calibration. The misforecast short-run dynamics are
collateral damage in the current framework. Future research should pull the short- and
long-run dynamics apart and isolate the misforecasts of long-run dynamics.
We study a productivity shock of X = 0:10: In the case of rational expectations, this
would correspond to a temporary increase in the capital stock that would peak about 2%
above the steady state capital stock four years after the initial impulse.
3.2 Impulse Response Functions
We rst report a series of impulse response functions that characterize the behavior of the
economy. For these gures we report the impulse response function for the rst 20 years
following the shock. In all of these gures we adopt the following conventions.
The dashed line represents the equilibrium path that would arise if agents all had rational
expectations (the case  = ^  = 0:25).
The dotted line represents the equilibrium path that would arise if agents' beliefs about
the future dynamics of X were accurate ( = ^  = 0:05). Motivated by our earlier work
(Fuster et al., 2011), we call this case the \natural expectations forecast."3 This is the
3This label is a partial misnomer in the current paper. In Fuster et al. (2011), natural expectations are
associated with correct short-run forecasts but incorrect long-run forecasts (the long-run forecasts do not
reect enough mean reversion). In the current paper, the short-run forecast and the long-run forecast reect
14impulse response function that our agents (mistakenly) anticipate.
The solid line represents the equilibrium path that actually does arise, given the mismatch
between beliefs (^  = 0:05) and reality ( = 0:25). We call this case the \natural expectations
path". This is the impulse response function that an outsider would observe. However, once
noise is added to the economy, it would be dicult to accurately estimate this impulse
response function unless the observor had a long time series database.
Figure 2 reports the impulse response for the productivity parameter X: In our illustrative
calibration, the process decays at an annual rate of 25% (rational expectations). However,
agents perceive that it decays at a rate of 5% (natural expectations forecast). Thus, they
are excessively optimistic after a positive shock and excessively pessimistic after a negative
shock.
Figure 3 reports the impulse response function for q; the price of a unit of installed
capital. Since investment is ane in q; this gure also reports the impulse response function
for investment. Under rational expectations, the price of capital should rise by 17% following
the productivity impulse and then fall back to its steady state level with a small amount of
overshooting on the way down. Under natural expectations, the price of capital rises by 26%
following the productivity impulse and then falls back to its steady state level with more
overshooting on the way down. Hence, the natural expectations case exhibits two kinds
of excess volatility.4 The price rises far more in the rst place and then overshoots more
on the way back to the steady state. This overshooting arises because of the overhang of
capital that needs to be decumulated as productivity falls. This capital overhang exists even
when expectations are rational, however, the overhang is stronger in the natural expectations
case, because agents under-estimate the degree of mean reversion in productivity (X) and
therefore accumulate too much capital in the few years immediately following the impulse.
Finally, note that all three plotted cases eventually return to a steady state value of 1 (though
insucient mean reversion. That is a necessary but undesirable consequence of the simple data generating
process { a rst-order auto-regressive process { that we are studying in the current paper.
4The classic papers on excess volatility in stock markets are LeRoy and Porter (1981) and Shiller (1981).
15this is not apparent on the truncated time scale in the gure).
Figure 4 reports the impulse response function for the instantaneous (annualized) excess
returns (omitting the \innite" positive rate5 of return when the initial impulse arrives).
In the rational expectations case, which is not reported, there are no excess returns (the
analogous rational expectations line is everywhere equal to zero). In the natural expectations
forecast, which is also not reported, there are also no excess returns, since these agents believe
that asset prices are ecient. By contrast, on the realized natural expectations path, there is
a long trail of negative excess returns. The magnitude of these excess returns is empirically
plausible. The negative excess returns begin at an annualized rate of  4% and slowly decline
in absolute magnitude.6 After ten years, the annualized excess return is  50 basis points.
Figure 5 reports the impulse response function for the protability of the corporate sec-
tor. Following the initial impulse prots jump up and then drift back down as (i) capital
is accumulated, driving down industry prots,7 and (ii) productivity itself, X, reverts back
toward its mean. In the rational expectations case, the convergence to the steady state level
of prots is nearly monotonic, with only a modest degree of overshooting. In Figure 5 the
rational expectations overshooting is nearly imperceptible.8 Hence, in the rational expecta-
tions case, prots are generally positively auto-correlated. In the natural expectations case,
5The instanteous rate of return is innite when the shock arrives, since q jumps up in value.
6In a more realistic model characterized by accurate short-run forecasts of X but inaccurate long-run
forecasts, the negative excess returns would arise only in the long-run of the impulse response function. See
e.g. Fama and French (1988a), Poterba and Summers (1988), and Cutler, Poterba, and Summers (1991) for
early evidence on negative long-run autocorrelation of excess returns in the stock market. Other authors,
such Campbell and Shiller (1988a,b) and Fama and French (1988b) study earnings and dividend yields
as predictors of future returns. In Fuster et al. (2011), we report that over the period 1929 to 2010, the
correlation between excess returns of equity over the risk-free rate in year  and cumulative excess returns
from year  + 2 to year  + 5 was  0:22, while the correlation between the ratio of S&P price at the end
of year  and average earnings over years    9 to  and excess returns from year  + 2 to year  + 5 was
 0:38. That paper also gives an overview of statistical caveats that apply to these ndings.
7Recall that the revenue per unit of capital function is assumed to be 1+X  K: As K rises, revenue per
unit of capital falls.
8Note that the steady state value in our calibrated economy is
K1  (K1;X1) = (1   )(1   [1   ] + 0)
= (1   )
= 0:0475
16the overshooting is much more pronounced, since the capital overhang is much greater. The
signcant degree of overshooting generates intermediate-horizon negative auto-correlation in
corporate prots.
Figure 6 reports the impulse response function for the level of aggregate capital. For
the rational expectations case, capital follows a hump-shaped pattern that peaks about four
years after the initial impulse. For the natural expectations case, capital also follows a
hump-shaped pattern that peaks about four years after the initial impulse. However, in the
natural expectations case, the amplitude of the capital response is 1.5 times as large as the
rational expectations case. The larger hump arises because of the mistaken belief that the
productivity impulse will only slowly mean-revert.
3.3 Dynamics in K-q Space
It is also useful to summarize the economy's dynamics with a gure in K-q space. Figure 7
draws out some of the key properties of the economy.
To read the gure, start in the lower left-hand corner. That point is the steady state.
After a shock arrives, the path jumps vertically. Specically, the price q jumps when the
initial news arrives (the stock K is not a jump variable). The jump in q is much greater for
the natural expectations case than for the rational expectations case. After the jump, the
dynamics take the economy in a loop that begins by moving to the southeast and eventually
returns to the (original) steady state. This loop is anticipated to be quite large (and slow)
in the natural expectations forecast. The dynamics turn out to be quicker than anticipated
because productivity turns out to mean-revert faster than anticipated. Nevertheless, the
path that is actually observed in equilibrium { the natural expectations path { has a far
larger loop than it would have had under rational expectations. Agents who under-estimate
mean reversion accumulate too much capital and later come to regret it when the asset price
(q) falls earlier and more than anticipated.
174 Conclusion
This paper examines a partial equilibrium investment problem in which agents underestimate
the strength of mean reversion in fundamentals. This deviation from rational expectations
generates the following equilibrium properties: (1) procyclical excess optimism, (2) exces-
sively volatile asset prices, (3) negatively autocorrelated excess returns, (4) a negative rela-
tionship between current corporate prots and future excess returns, (5) excessively volatile
investment cycles, and (6) negatively autocorrelated corporate prots in the medium run.
The analysis that we have described provides a parsimonious and psychologically plausible
explanation for a wide range of puzzling empirical patterns. The model also generates a series
of falsiable predictions of some regularities that have not yet been empirically investigated.
Future work should test these predictions.
In this paper, we have assumed that the misperception of mean reversion applies to
the beliefs about the \fundamental" driving process (here, productivity). However, one
could argue that in reality, individuals' and rms' investment decisions may be inuenced
more directly by their perception of future price paths, which are in turn endogenous to
expectations. It would be interesting to extend the model in this direction.
Another natural follow-up question is how non-rational expectations and non-fundamental
asset price movements aect optimal monetary policy. While the illustrative model in this
paper is too simple to allow adequate analysis of the trade-os involved, work by Dupor
(2005) and Mertens (2010) makes progress on this important question.
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22Figure 2: Impulse Response Function for Productivity
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23Figure 3: Impulse Response Functions for q
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24Figure 4: Impulse Response Functions for Excess Returns
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25Figure 5: Impulse Response Functions for Flow Prots
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26Figure 6: Impulse Response Functions for Capital
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27Figure 7: K-q Diagram for Impulse Response
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